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DISCOURAGEMENT OF PRIVATE TREBLE DAMAGE SUITS
THROUGH A SIMPLE REFUSAL TO DEAL*
MANY Supreme Court decisions have established that a manufacturer's re-
fusal to continue to deal with customers in order to maintain prices,' acquire
a monopoly, 2 or restrain trade can be enjoined as a violation of the antitrust
laws. 3 Where a refusal to deal was intended to deter customers from bringing
private treble damage suits against a manufacturer found to have violated
the Robinson-Patman Act,4 however, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit declined to hold such refusals unlawful either as a separate viola-
tion of the antitrust laws or as a form of economic coercion. 5 This decision,
in precluding injunctive relief against such refusals, appears to lack a proper
regard for the role of private treble damage suits in the effective enforcement
of the antitrust laws.
Simplicity Pattern Co., the largest domestic manufacturer of tissue patterns
used in making women's and children's clothing, was found to have violated
section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act by affording its volume customers free
transportation and special credit terms. 6 Relying on this finding,7 forty-three
*House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962).
1. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (violation of §§ 1 and 3
of the Sherman Act by refusing to deal with wholesalers who dealt with retailers not ad-
hering to suggested retail prices). See Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The
Ban on Resale Price Maintenance, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 258 (Kurland ed. 1960).
2. Given the requisite market position, a refusal to deal may constitute an unlawful
use of monopoly power subject to attack under the monopolization provisions of § 2 of the
Sherman Act. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (sole newspaper
attempting to exploit the market by refusing to sell advertising to concerns which also ad-
vertised on a neighboring radio station) ; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials
Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927) (refusing to sell to jobber who would not sell out) ; United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (price squeeze). But cf. Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). See also NEALE, THE
ANTITRUST LAws OF THE UNITED STATES OF AmERIcA 132-35 (1960).
3. Concerted refusals to deal can also constitute antitrust violations. Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) ; Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). And actions to make refusals effective in maintain-
ing resale prices can constitute a violation of § 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958), which forbids practices
having a dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly. E.g., FTC
v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922), where a manufacturer utilized a code on
its products to detect non-conformists to its schedule of retail prices in order to carry out
its policy of refusing to deal with such retailers.
4. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
5. House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962).
6. The original judgment against Simplicity by the FTC was under § 2(e) of the Clay-
ton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1958), which makes it un-
lawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against another. Simplicity
violated this provision by requiring the smaller fabric stores to pay cash while furnishing
their product to the larger variety stores on a consignment basis, requiring only its smaller
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of Simplicity's customers commenced treble damage suits.8 In retaliation Sim-
plicity informed these plaintiffs that it would exercise its power to terminate
renewable five year contracts at the end of the term unless such suits were
withdrawn.9
Because Simplicity offered to continue dealing with customers who would
abandon their damage suits, the district court concluded that Simplicity's can-
cellations were part of a deliberate plan designed "to deter litigants by economic
coercion from pursuing the lawful remedies granted them by Congress under
the antitrust laws."'1 This court believed that to allow such refusals was
to permit an antitrust violator of great economic strength to rest secure from
remedial and punitive action by private litigants."' Since this result would sub-
stantially frustrate the policy underlying the congressional grant of private
antitrust remedies, the court held that protection of the overriding public in-
terest in the effective enforcement of the antitrust laws through such actions
warrants an injunction requiring Simplicity to continue dealing with treble-
damage-suit-customers on the same terms and conditions as provided in the
terminated contracts until the trial of the antitrust suit; the authority for the
issuance of such injunction and for bonds required of plaintiff as security was
found in section 16 of the Clayton Act. 2 At the time of the trial, the court
added, Simplicity would have further opportunity to assert legitimate business
reasons for the termination of its relationship with these customers. 13
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, after a detailed examination
of the various provisions of the antitrust laws, reversed '4 primarily because
of a finding that Simplicity's refusals to deal were not within the purview of
the antitrust laws ;'r therefore, there was no authority to issue an injunction
customers to pay for catalogues, and providing only the larger stores with free transporta-
tion costs. FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 60 (1959).
7. Section 5 of the Clayton Act provides that a final judgment or decree rendered in a
suit brought by the United States may be used by any other party as prima facie evidence
of such matters as would be an estoppel as between the parties in the government suit. 38
Stat. 731 (1914); 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1958).
8. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958):
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained....
9. P. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 191 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
Subsequent cancellations in accordance with this policy are what prompted the affected
plaintiffs to seek temporary injunctive relief on the theory that such action by Simplicity
was actuated solely as a punitive measure against them for pursuing their legal rights
under the antitrust laws and was part of a concerted plan to deter other customers from
bringing treble damage suits. Ibid.
10. Id. at 61.
11. Ibid.
12. Id. at 63.
13. Id. at 64.
14. House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962).
15. The Second Circuit found it "too plain to merit discussion" that Simplicity's re-
fusals to deal were not violations of the Clayton Act. Id. at 871. See Barber, Refusals to
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under section 16, since it authorizes issuance of a preliminary injunction only
when immediate injury is threatened by a violation of such laws.16 The appel-
late court, contrary to the trial court's finding that Simplicity's cancellations
were part of a concerted plan 1 7 found "no indication that Simplicity went 'be-
yond mere announcement of policy and the simple refusal to deal,' or that it
has employed 'other means' of a combination .... 18 Moreover, even if de-
fendant's refusal was in accordance with a "concerted plan,"' 9 such action
Deal Under The Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847, 848 (1955). But see
Comment, Refusals to Sell and Public Control of Competitions, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1132-34
(1949), which takes the position that unilateral refusals to sell as such should be held to
violate § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958),
which forbids unwarranted price discrimination which substantially lessens competition or
creates a monopoly, because refusals to sell are total price discriminations.
16. Section 16 provides:
Any person.., shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief . .. against
threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws,... when and under
the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief . .. is granted by courts of
equity,... and upon the execution of proper bond....
38 Stat. 737 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958).
17. P. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 191 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
18. House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867, 870 (2d Cir. 1962).
This test for determining whether the joint action requirement of § 1 of the Sherman Act,
26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958), is satisfied was recently announced
in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960). The Second Circuit found
that Simplicity's action did not amount to the exactment of an express or implied contract,
a conspiracy, conduct tantamount to an agreement, or any concerted refusal to deal and
thus did not amount to conduct beyond the Parke Davis test. House of Materials, Inc. v.
Simplicity Pattern Co., supra at 870. Apparently a theory which would imply joint action
between Simplicity and those potential treble damage plaintiffs who had not yet brought
such actions and by refraining from doing so enabled Simplicity to refuse more effectively
to deal with customers who had initiated suits was not presented to the court. For the
view that this theory of implied conspiracy is "rather nonsensical," see Alexander, Private
Antitrust Actions For Refusals to Deal, 6 ST. Louis L. REv. 489, 500 (1961).
19. The joint action requirement of § 1 of the Sherman Act does not necessitate two
completely independent business entities. A group of corporate employees has been found
guilty of conspiracy. Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. 599, 618 (6th Cir. 1915). And a
conspiracy has been found between a single movie exhibitor and its officers. White Bear
Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1942). However, in both
cases violations of both §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act were found and it is possible to
explain these cases as attempts to monopolize, thus making unnecessary the considerations
of § 1 violations. Moreover, where there is no § 2 charge, no court has found a conspiracy
in restraint of trade solely in an action between a corporation and its officers. 1955 Ar'y
GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 31. But see Comment, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy
Under the Sherman Act, 63 YALE L.J. 372, 388 (1954) ("officers of a single corporation
should. . . be separate persons for purposes of antitrust enforcement"). Conspiracies have
been found where the multicorporate form has been involved; both where one defendant
has control of several corporations, United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947),
and where one corporation owns the controlling stock interests of another. Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). More recently, the Court of
Appeals of the Seventh Circuit without explanation as to what form of joint action, was
involved found a violation of § I of the Sherman Act in a case solely involving a single cor-
poration that refused to deal with wholesalers who would not maintain the suggested prices of
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would not constitute a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, since there
was no undue restraint of trade, or of any other provision of the antitrust
laws.20 Recognizing that a court may have the power to restrain interference
with a lawsuit in order to protect the integrity of the judicial system or the
individual plaintiff's interest, the court apparently believed that such power
did not exist in the circumstances of this case, since plaintiffs' lawsuit was for
an antitrust violation. And even if such power existed, its exercise was not
justified,2 1 for an injunction would severely restrict the common law right
of a manufacturer freely to choose his customers. In addition, it appeared
anomalous to this court that customers could acquire additional rights under
terminable contracts against a manufacturer merely by commencing treble
damages suits.22
Although the decision of the court of appeals seems correct in criticizing the
district court for basing its use of the injunctive power on section 16 without
specifying which provisions of the antitrust laws proscribed the defendant's
conduct, the court's conclusion that a refusal to deal intended to deter treble
damage actions is beyond the scope of the antitrust laws is not self-evident.
This conclusion was based on United States v. Colgate & Co.,23 which held
that the common law right of a trader or manufacturer to choose his customers
was not restricted by the Sherman Act when his choice was exercised inde-
pendently of other traders or manufacturers and was not intended to create or
maintain a monopoly. This decision initially cast doubt upon the continuing
validity of another Supreme Court decision, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
D. Park & Sons Co., 4 which denied a manufacturer the right to refuse to deal
with anyone violating written contracts specifying resale prices. 26 The Court
the corporation as well as the suggested prices of the corporation's competitors for their
products. A.C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 272 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1959). Contra: Nelson
Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952) (absurd to be-
lieve a single corporation "conspired with itself to restrain its trade in its own products").
20. House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir.
1962). A district court has expressly declared a refusal to deal in a similar case a valid
exercise of a manufacturer's right to choose his own customers. Bergen Drug Co.
v. Parke, Davis & Co., TrADE REG. REP. (1961 Trade Cas.) ff 70151, at 75501 (D.N.J.
Oct. 18, 1961).
21. House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., stpra note 20, at 871.
22. See id. at 872.
23. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
24. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
25. An example of this confusion is United States v. A. Schrader's Son Inc., 264 Fed.
175 (N.D. Ohio 1919). The district court sustained a demurrer to the indictment charg-
ing execution by a components manufacturer of price-fixing agreements with retailers,
jobbers, and manufacturers who used the manufacturer's products. The court reasoned that
granted the fundamental proposition in Colgate that a manufacturer has a right to specify
resale prices and to refuse to deal with those who fail to maintain them, it was a distinction
without a difference to say that one may so refuse to deal if the price-fixing agreement was
tacit rather than written as in Dr. Miles. Thus, there must have been some other distinc-
tion between Dr. Miles and Colgate, and this appeared to be that a purpose to create and
maintain a monopoly must be shown in the indictment; a fact present in Dr. Miles, but not
in Colgate or the present case. Id. at 184-85.
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subsequently explained, however, that Colgate only meant that a manufacturer
is not guilty of a conspiracy if he merely indicates the resale price and declines
to deal with those who do not observe them, but that there is an unlawful com-
bination when an agreement, express or implied, attempts to bind customers
to resale price maintenance. 28 Subsequent decisions have made it clear that any
action in a resale price fixing context beyond the "mere announcement" and
"simple refusal" nullifies the effect of any countervailing right to choose cus-
tomers.27 Such decisions have so eroded the common law right to choose cus-
tomers that the Second Circuit described the Colgate remnant as applying
only to situations "of such Doric simplicity as to be somewhat rare in this day
of complex business enterprise." 28 Simplicity's refusal was characterized as
such a situation. 29 The district court in the instant case did not deny that the
right to refuse to deal still survives in some contexts, but asserted that such
refusals must always be evaluated in the context in which they occur and bal-
anced against other considerations militating against the protection of this
right.8 0
Unlike the district court, however, the court of appeals refused to balance
the importance of antitrust enforcement against infringement of the manu-
facturer's freedom to choose his customers. Although the lower court granted
the injunction primarily because defendant's refusal was likely to thwart the
public policy reflected in the private treble damage suit provisions,8 1 this con-
sideration was not mentioned in the opinion reversing the district court. In
fact, the only countervailing consideration recognized by the appellate court
26. United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920). The Supreme Court,
in reversing the district court's decision in United States v. A. Schrader's Son, supra
note 25, emphasized that the district court had misapprehended the meaning of Colgate;
there was no intent in Colgate to overrule the Dr. Miles doctrine. For in Colgate, unlike
Dr. Miles and the present case, the indictment made no allegation of agreement express or
implied which undertook to fix resale prices. 252 U.S. at 99.
27. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960).
28. George A. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir.
1960). The court also quoted at 790 from Comment, Refusals to Sell and Public Control of
Competition, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1129 (1949):
When a leading case is beset by qualifications and then atrophied by lack of use, its
final demise is difficult to detect. Perhaps the Colgate case is dead, despite frequent
citation. But doubt remains. The Colgate case, still a symbol of special immunity
for all refusals to sell, should be expressly overruled at the earliest opportunity.
See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
supra note 27, at 49 ("[T]he court has done no less than send to its demise the Colgate
doctrine... ."). See also Levi, supra note 11, at 324 ("Colgate ... while not now over-
ruled, has only a tenuous status.") ; Comment, The Parke, Davis Case: Refusal to Deal
and the Shernui Act, 1961 DuKE L.J. 120, 132 ("[R]ather than overruling the Colgate
decision, Parke, Davis, serves only to delimit it further.").
29. House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867, 870 (2d Cir.
1962).
30. See P.W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 191 F. Supp. 55, 61 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
31. See id. at 61, 64.
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was the plaintiff's individual interest in not being coerced into choosing be-
tween collection of treble damages for the manufacturer's violation and main-
tenance of valuable business relations with the defendant. 32 Confining its inquiry
to this interest, it was possible to conclude that doctrines of business coercion
should not be extended to confer upon plaintiffs benefits to which they would
not otherwise be entitled under the existing sales agreements.33 The court ex-
cluded consideration of the statutory scheme provided by Congress for
enforcement of the antitrust laws apparently because Simplicity's refusals were
found not to violate any specific provision of the antitrust laws.34 Thus, the
issuance of an injunction in the absence of such violation would amount "to
an extension of the remedies given by Congress under the Sherman and Clay-
ton Acts."13 5 This reasoning, however, assumes that a court is without power
to deal with refusals which frustrate the enforcement policy of the antitrust
laws unless such refusals constitute a violation of these laws, either because
section 16 of the Clayton Act is the exclusive source of such power or be-
cause the antitrust laws pre-empt the entire field of substantive law dealing
with the use of economic pressures to achieve socially undesirable objectives.
It is doubtful, however, that section 16, in light of its legislative history
and purpose, precludes the use of a court's general equity power to provide
injunctive relief for conduct which, although interfering with the enforcement
of the antitrust laws, does not itself violate such laws. Since section 16 was
prescribed at a time when it appeared that a party threatened with injury
from an antitrust violation was unable to secure injunctive relief,36 its prob-
32. See House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867, 872 n.12a
(2d Cir. 1962).
33. Id. at 872.
34. See id. at 871.
35. Ibid.
36. Prior to the passage of the Sherman Act a private party suffering irreparable
injury and lacking an adequate remedy at law could under traditional equity principles
bring an action. for temporary injunctive relief in order to protect a legal right elsewhere
granted by law. See, e.g., 19 R.C.L. Monopolies and Combinations § 161 (1917). Section 4
of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1958), was the first
provision specifically providing for injunctive relief where an antitrust violation was in-
volved. But § 4 authorized the United States district attorneys to instigate proceedings.
The effect of this authorization was to create a confusion among the district courts. Some
courts construed § 4 as obliterating a private party's right to injunctive relief for an anti-
trust violation under traditional equity principles. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deer-
ing, 254 U.S. 443, 465 (1921) ; National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders' Ass'n, 169
Fed. 259 (2d Cir. 1909) ; 51 CoNG. REc. 16319 (1914) ("only one power that might enjoin
an unlawful trust") (remarks of Representative Floyd). Others distinguished between the
public and private nature of the harm, and while recognizing that private parties could not
utilize § 4 for injunctive relief, allowed them resort to the court's general equity powers
if private harm was present. Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 155 Fed. 869 (C.C.
W.D. Mich. 1907) ; Blindell v. Hagan, 54 Fed. 40 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893). This construction
of § 4 is not unique. Where a statute charges a public official with its enforcement, private
persons are often considered barred from maintaining an action based upon that statute.
See, e.g., Meyercheck v. Givens, 180 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1950) (only Housing Expediter
may secure injunction against violations of Housing and Rent Act) ; Johnson v. Sark Diego
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able purpose was to make clear that section 4 of the Sherman Act, the pro-
vision authorizing United States district attorneys to enjoin antitrust violations,
was not meant to limit a private party's access to a court's equity power.37
The language of section 16 was thus specifically directed at violations of the
antitrust laws because it was just such situations in which misconstructions
by the courts had resulted in unintended limitations upon the remedies avail-
able to private parties for antitrust violations. The primary concern of Con-
gress in enacting the Clayton Act, moreover, was to expand rather than limit
the remedies used in antitrust enforcement.38 It is therefore unlikely that
Congress intended this provision to deprive courts of the power to enjoin con-
duct interfering with the enforcement mechanism of any statutory scheme,
including the antitrust laws. For this reason section 16 seems irrelevant to the
issue presented by the instant case. And clearly the enactment of the antitrust
laws was not intended to deprive courts of their traditional power to fashion sub-
stantive legal rules, other than those embodied in the Sherman, Clayton, or
Robinson-Patman Acts, to control abusive uses of economic influence, such
as the doctrines of duress and coercion. That a particular undesirable
exercise of economic power is similar to those proscribed by the antitrust
statutes does not warrant the conclusion that Congress intended it to be
immune from judicial control. And it should not be inferred from the absence
of legislation protecting the treble damage provisions that Congress meant to
Waiters Union, 190 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Cal. 1961) (only'Secretary of Labor may sue to
set aside union election) ; International Longshoremen's Union v. Sunset Line & Twine
Co., 77 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Cal. 1948) (only NLRB may secure injunctive relief pending
adjudication of unfair labor practice charges).
The situation was further confused by a Supreme Court dictum suggesting that Con-
gress has intended to foreclose private suitors from access to injunctive relief from anti-
trust violations. Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48, 71 (1904) :
Possibly the thought of Congress was that by such a limitation upon suits in equity
of a general nature to restrain violations of the act, irrespective of any direct injury
sustained by particular persons or corporations, ... trade and commerce ... would
not be needlessly disturbed by suits brought ....
Yet in this case there was no showing of any private harm apart from public harm and
such a situation would foreclose the possibility of an injunction being granted to a private
party even though the court had power to issue it under its general equity power. See
Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 471 (1917) ("No one would maintain that the
injunction should be granted to parties not showing special injury to themselves.").
37. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 465 (1921) ("Evidently
this provision [section 16] was intended to supplement the Sherman Act, under which
some of the federal courts had held ... that a private party could not maintain a suit for
injunction."). The congressional reports and the discussions of this section on the floor of
Congress are inconclusive as to whether Congress had any intent to make § 16 the ex-
clusive route to equitable remedies. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 21
(1914); S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1914); 51 CONG. REc. 9261 (1914)
(remarks of Representative McGillicuddy). Cf. Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., No. 13,901,
3d Cir., March 28, 1962 at 4 (in absence of express statutory provision to contrary general
equity powers present). See also Automative News, June 25, 1962, p. 2.
38. United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573, 581 (1948). See 51 CONG.
REc. 16319 (1914) (remarks of Representative Floyd).
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allow interference with its enforcement mechanism. Relief in such circum-
stances does not supplement the remedies provided by Congress, but protects
their efficacy. Thus, a finding that Simplicity's refusal to deal is not violative
of the antitrust laws should not preclude a court from examining the impact
of such conduct on the public interest in effective antitrust enforcement.
Once it is decided that section 16 or other antitrust provisions do not re-
strict the scope of inquiry, a determination of whether a court should compel
a manufacturer to continue to deal with present or potential treble-damage-
suit-plaintiffs not only requires consideration of the customers' interest in being
free from such economic retaliation but also an evaluation of the social in-
terest in protecting such customers' statutory right to bring treble damage
actions. Evolving common law and statutory doctrines of business coercion
reveal a heightened awareness on the part of the courts and Congress of the
interest of an individual with inferior bargaining power to be free to assert
his legal rights against those with whom he does business.3 9 Although ad-
mittedly the doctrines of unlawful business compulsion are extremely vague
and uncertain, they plainly establish that an unfair use of one's economic
power, apart from the antitrust laws, may constitute an abuse of legal rights
justifying judicial intervention. 40 The general theory under which relief is
granted is that the contracting party profiting from his imposition has received
money or contractual rights which he ought not to be permitted to re-
tain. 41 This theory, however, does not provide for the situation in Simplicity,
where the coerced party seeks affirmative relief in the form of compelling
the manufacturer to continue to deal under contracts which have expired
by their own terms.42 Requiring Simplicity to deal with its treble-damage-
suit customers would not serve the function of preventing unjust enrichment,
since Simplicity received no benefits from the termination of the contracts to
which he would not otherwise be entitled. Moreover, the doctrine of business
compulsion, in the absence of statute, has not been used to require a. manu-
39. 17A Am. JuA. Duress and Undue Influence § 7, at 564 (1957) ; Annot., 79 A.L.R.
655 (1932).
40. The general rule that a threat to do what one has a legal right to do does not con-
stitute unlawful coercion has been severely restricted. E.g., Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 57 N.J.
Super. 278, 154 A.2d 625 (1959) (threat to sell subdivision home to undesirable person un-
less subdivider released purchaser from contract constitutes breach). The Restatement of
Contracts, moreover, states that acts or threats that exert such pressure as to impair the
exercise of free judgment may be wrongful "though they are not criminal or tortious or in
violation of a contractual duty." RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcrS § 492, comment g (1932). Cf.
U.C.C. § 2-302. Most situations in which the doctrine of business compulsion has been in-
voked, however, involve a party seeking rescission, modification, or cancellation of a contract,
e.g., French v. Shoemaker, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 314 (1872), or seeking to recover monetary
payments made under such agreements, e.g., Ramp Bldgs. Corp. v. Northwest Bldg. Co., 164
Wash. 603, 4 P.2d 507 (1932).
41. Annot., 79 A.L.R. 655, 658 (1932).
42. While one of the plaintiffs in the district court had a breach of contract action
against Simplicity, P.W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 191 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.
N.Y. 1961), this plaintiff apparently did not post the necessary security and the issue was
not before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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facturer to continue dealing with previous customers, apparently because a sup-
plier's freedom to choose its buyers and to refuse to sell to litigious customers still
has significance. The Dealer's Day in Court Act, however, gives an automobile
dealer the right to bring an action for damages and presumably for an injunc-
tion against a manufacturer who fails to act in good faith in "complying
with the terms of franchises or in terminating or not renewing franchises
with dealers." 48 This enactment, although confined to automobile dealers, shows
a recognition of a policy protecting a contracting party from the unfair asser-
tion of legal rights by another in a superior bargaining position in the context
of established business relationships.44 Nevertheless, it is not clear whether
established or evolving common law doctrines warranted relief to Simplicity's
customers on the basis of their own individual interests.
But the interests to be considered in Simplicity were not only those of the
plaintiff customers, 45 for injunctive relief was also sought to protect the social
I
43. 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1958). For an excellent discussion of the
ramifications of this act, see Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration
by Contract, 66 YALE L.J. 1135 (1957). Good faith is defined as a duty of each party to act
in an equitable manner "so as to guarantee . . . freedom from coercion, intimidation, or
threats of coercion... ." 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1231(e) (1958). The meaning
of "coercion" has been interpreted:
X coerces Y. means: (1) X offers Y the choice of doing X's bidding or else being
subjected to some sanction; and (2) X has the power to exercise the sanction against
Y; but (3) for X to exercise the sanction against Y is not lawful, or for Y to do as
X bids would serve an unlawful end of X....
Kessler & Stem, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 106
n.478 (1959).
44. A court of appeals has recently held that although the Dealer's Day in Court Act
only provides for damages in case of a bad faith refusal to deal, a court, in the absence of
an express statutory provision to the contrary, could issue an injunction compelling the
manufacturer to deal in order to make more effective the legal right created by the act.
Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., No. 13,901, 3d Cir., March 28, 1962. A similar issue is
presently pending before a federal district court. Automotive News, June 25, 1962, p. 2 .
45. Balancing the equities to determine whether an injunction should be granted tradi-
tionally entails consideration of several factors; the adequacy of remedies other than in-
junctions, see Black & Yales, Inc. v. Mahogany Ass'n, Inc., 129 F.2d 227, 232-33 (3d Cir.
1942) ; the hardship on Simplicity if the injunction is granted or on plaintiffs if it is denied,
see Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 815 (1929) ; the effectiveness of the injunction
in protecting the rights sought to be protected, ibid.; the ease of its administration, 7 MooRn,
FEDERAL PRACTIcE 1 65.18(3), at 1690 (2d ed. 1955) ; the impact the grant or denial of such
relief would have on the public interest, see Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515,
552 (1937) (courts able to go farther if public interest involved) ; and the good faith of
the parties, see National Fire Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 U.S. 331, 338 (1930). While there
are cases where it is clear that an injunction should be denied as where jurisdiction is
absent, Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941), or where it should be granted
as where the denial is improper as a matter of law, United States v. City and County of
San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 31 (1940) (injunction to prevent city from using federal land
grant in violation of terms), an injunction application is generally addressed to the discre-
tion of the district court. E.g., American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 219 F.2d 223, 224 (2d
Cir. 1955). Therefore, the test on appeal is not whether the appellate court would have
issued an injunction in its discretion, but whether the district court abused its discretion.
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interest in the effective prosecution of antitrust violators. The gravamen of the
plaintiffs' argument was that Simplicity refused to continue dealing not because
its customers were litigious, but because of an avowed and unequivocal policy
to dissuade these and thousands of potential plaintiffs from commencing treble
damage actions. 46 Unquestionably Simplicity's refusals to deal were part of a
"deliberate plan to cancel contracts of all those who elect to assert their
rights."47 The district court also found that a denial of injunctive relief would
cause irreparable injury to the plaintiffs because other competing patterns
would not be adequate substitutes for Simplicity's. 48 Without this source of
supply, the "competitive disadvantage under which plaintiffs are placed is
severe."49 Clearly these and potential plaintiffs must choose between foregoing
their right to a treble damage action and asserting this right and suffering
irreparable injury. Because of the importance of Simplicity's product to the
businesses of these small customers as compared with the relatively small judg-
ments which they could expect to gain by suit,50 the customers would undoubt-
edly be hesitant to bring treble damage actions when threatened by refusals to
deal.51 Refusals to deal therefore can be effectively employed to render nugatory
the deterrent effect of the private treble damage suit.
5 2
The private litigants' statutory right to treble damages has been character-
ized as one created by Congress to make such private suitors "allies of the
E.g., United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 437-38 (1936). Although the elements neces-
sary to constitute an abuse of discretion appear to vary depending upon the legal context,
it seems fair to say that it is more difficult to find an abuse of discretion in some contexts
such as where a writ of mandamous is sought than to find abuse of discretion in the grant
of a temporary injunction. Compare United States v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352, 359-60 (1933),
with Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1940). And even
within the area of injunctive relief itself, courts because of their traditional reluctance to
utilize the injunctive remedy more readily have found abuse of discretion in cases where
the injunction was granted than in cases where it was denied. See 4 POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 1338, at 935 n.3 (5th ed. 1941).
46. P.W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 191 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
See affidavit of Herman Friedman, Brief for Appellee, p. 10b, House of Materials, Inc. v.
Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962) (knowledge of Simplicity's policy of
cancelling contracts).
47. P. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., supra note 46, at 59.
48. Id. at 63. See affidavit of Herman Friedman, Brief for Appellee, p. 10b, House of
Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962) ; affidavit of Samuel
Clarvit, id. at 16b.
49. P.W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., supra note 46, at 64.
50. It appears that the recovery to the plaintiffs would be treble the value to the plain-
tiffs of receiving the patterns on a consignment basis with free transportation and the free
use of Simplicity's catalogues. See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 60 (1959).
51. See Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66
YALE L.J. 1135, 1165 (1957) ; Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The
Robinson-Patman Experience, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 181, 200 (1961) ; Comment, Anti-
trust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage
Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1057 n.309 (1952).
52. See 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1338 (5th ed. 1941) (emphasis on
affirmative aspect of injunction).
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government in enforcing the antitrust laws."'53 Since the treble damage action
is an instrument of tremendous economic force 54 and because other enforce-
ment tools are frequently ineffective as a deterrent to future violations,5 5 the
private treble damage suit is an important weapon in the prophylactic arsenal
of antitrust enforcement.5 6 In addition, its use should be encouraged, for by
taking from the antitrust violator and giving to the violator's theoretically in-
jured victims, the treble damage action has a greater tendency to repair com-
petitive injury than the more punitive criminal fine or government restraining
order.
57
Thus the issuance of a temporary injunction in the instant case, though
characterized by the Second Circuit as "singularly inappropriate,"5 8" appears
of sufficient affirmative value to general antitrust policy as well as to present and
potential treble-damage-suit plaintiffs to merit greater consideration.5" For were
the injunction to run for the duration of the statute of limitations, 60 it would
prevent Simplicity from using this form of economic coercion until all cus-
tomers desiring to bring actions had done so. Upon the expiration of the period
of limitation and consequent dissolution of the injunction, Simplicity would be
53. 51 CONG. REc. 16319 (1914) (remarks of Representative Floyd).
54. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1961, p. 1, col. 1 (filing by 44 utility companies of actions
seeking over one hundred million dollars in treble damages).
55. In one case the criminal fine amounted to only one ten millionth of the net profits.
See Comment, Increasing Community Control over Corporate Crime-A Problem in the
Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 286-87 (1961). The maximum penalty was increased
from $5,000 to $50,000 in 1955, 69 Stat. 282, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). Not only does the pro-
vision remain inherently inadequate for many cases, but it appears that the maximum
penalty is asked for by the Justice Department only in "flagrant cases." See Comment,
Increasing Community Control over Corporate Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanc-
tions, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 287 (1961).
56. E.g., Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4
ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1959) ; Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Anti-
trust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167 (1958) ; Wham, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits: The Gov-
ernment's Chief Aid in Enforcement, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954).
57. Treble damage actions also increase the incentive of private parties to bring to the
attention of the courts violations of the antitrust laws, which should tend to relieve the
burden on the Department of Justice. But cases are seldom brought unless the government
previously has won a case. See Note, Clayton Act, Section 5: Aid to Treble Damage
Suitors?, 61 YALE L.J. 417 (1952). The government's connection can be used as a prima facie
case in the treble damage action under § 5 of the Clayton Act. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15
U.S.C. § 16 (1958). See generally Timberlake, The Use of Government Obtained Judg-
ments or Decrees in Subsequent Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 36
N.Y.U.L. REv. 991 (1961) ; Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis
of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010 (1952).
58. House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir.
1962).
59. There is no other remedy available to the plaintiffs. Nor does it seem that the
plaintiffs in this case have the means to obtain legislative relief for future protection of
their private actions. For the difficulties that the automobile dealers encountered in obtain-
ing legislative relief, see Kessler, supra note 51, at 1167-75.
60. Treble damage actions are bound unless commenced within four years after the
cause of action accrues. 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1958).
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free to refuse to deal. The economic motivation underlying its initial policy,
however, would now be absent; termination of contracts would no longer serve
to thwart potential treble damage actions, 61 and Simplicity's asserted problem
of maintaining harmonious business relationships 62 with litigious customers
would be considerably alleviated. Furthermore, the burden of the temporary
injunction on Simplicity seems far less than it contends. The previous rela-
tionship between Simplicity and the plaintiffs had been profitable and no rea-
son is shown why the dealings would not continue to be profitable in the
future.63 The restrictions would not be of a permanent nature,6 4 and the in-
junction is not applicable to refusals to deal motivated by other bona fide busi-
ness reasons.65 Finally, although such an injunction may be extremely difficult
to administer in business contexts where close cooperation between the parties
is necessary and the nature of the relationship involves complex business deal-
ings, in this case, where thousands of customers 6 have entered into contracts
with identical terms 67 for a simple and uniform mass produced article, the
harmonious functioning of the business relationship need not be impaired by
the existence of litigation.
Though the customers' dual interest in maintaining their treble damage suits
and in continuing a profitable relationship with an antitrust violator may be
an insufficient basis for injunctive relief, the presence of the public interest in
antitrust enforcement may well justify a different result than the one reached
by the court of appeals. Denial of relief in Simplicity, however, may be defen-
sible, albeit for reasons other than those advanced by the court. The Second
Circuit may have been influenced by the Attorney General's Committee's con-
cern with the unfairness of subjecting unwitting violators of the Robinson-
Patman Act to the same hazards as intentional violators of the Sherman Act.68
This concern led the Committee to propose the substitution of the trial judge's
discretion to award double or treble damages for the present mandatory treble
damage requirement.69 While the reactions to this proposal ranged from dis-
agreements over the incentive necessary for the bringing of private actions 70
61. See note 49 spra and accompanying text.
62. House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir.
1962).
63. P.W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 191 F. Supp. 55, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
64. See ibid.
65. The district court in this case recognized that a bona fide business reason would
be a ground for denying the issuance of the injunction. Id. at 59.
66. FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 59 (1959).
67. See P. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 191 F. Supp. 55, 57 (1961).
68. The Supreme Court noted that in violating the Robinson-Patman Act, Simplicity
had "apparently acted entirely in good faith." FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55,
61 n.4 (1959). See House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867, 872
n.12 (2d Cir. 1962).
69. 1955 ArT'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 378.
70. Wham, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits: The Government's Chief Aid in Enforce-
mnent, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061, 1062 (1954). See Comment, Increasing Community Control Over
Corporate Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 296 (1961),
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to the consideration of the deterrent effect the proposal would have on the num-
ber of consent decrees obtained,71 the choice has nonetheless remained one
between treble damages and no damages.72 Perhaps the court of appeals could
reasonably conclude that favoring the manufacturer's right to choose his own
customers at the expense of thwarting treble damage actions was preferable in
actions based on a Robinson-Patman violation. But, given similar facts and a
Sherman Act violation upon which to base the treble damage action, it would
appear that a temporary injunction to protect the right of litigants to a treble
damage claim should properly be issued.
predicting that the proposal might increase the probability of recovery in some actions,
but at the expense of decreasing the magnitude of recovery in any given case, thus decreas-
ing incentive and the number of actions. But see 1955 ATT'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST
REP. 379.
71. The number of consent decrees, obtained usually prior to the taking of evidence,
might decrease because the consequences of the government action being used as a prima
facie case in a subsequent private action would be lessened. Wham, supra note 70, at 1062.
72. Treble damage recoveries might be required in some circumstances in order to
reimburse a plaintiff for his effort in bringing the action. The attorneys' fees awarded are
often insufficient to cover the actual fees. See Doyle, Treble Damages and Counsel Fees,
AN ANTITRUST HANDIBOOK 549, 565 (1958). It is difficult and sometimes impossible to
show the damages proximately caused in attempting to show deprivation of business or
profits over a period of time. See Momand v. Universal Film Exchanges, 172 F.2d 37, 43
(1st Cir. 1948) ; Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 167, 170 (1958). And the government subjects the entire amount of antitrust
treble damage recoveries to income taxation in the year of receipt. Commissioner v. Glen-
shaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 (1955). See generally Magill, The Income Tax Aspects
of Antitrust Litigation, 30 TAxEs 210 (1952).
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